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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
STATE OF UTAH, by and through its
ROAD COMMISSION,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.

Case No.
8754

DENVER AND RIO GRANDE WESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY, a Delaware corporation,
Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
The parties will sometimes be designated in this brief
as follows: Plaintiff and Appellant, State of Utah, by and
through its Road Commission, as the "Road Commission",
Defendant and Respondent, Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad Company, as the "Rio Grande". Emphasis
has been supplied.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This appeal involves a very narrow question. The problem is simply whether the trial court erred in denying the
application of the Road Commission, on summary motion to
occupy and thereby to seize and destroy Rio Grande's Little
Cottonwood Branch of railroad. The trial court has never
considered or determined the ultimate rights of the parties.
The issues to be resolved in determining those rights must
await the trial of the case. The court below simply refused,
under the showing made on the preliminary motion, to
authorize the Road Commission immediately to occupy the
premises sought to be condemned. In this we believe the
trial court acted with manifest propriety.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
While there is no substantial issue of fact, we believe
the statement as presented by counsel for the Road Commission does not sufficiently advise the court of the essential facts involved. For this reason, respondent presents
the following statement of facts.
Rio Grande is a common carrier of persons and property by rail in intrastate and interstate commerce. Its main
line of railroad from Salt Lake City to Colorado points runs
in a north and south direction generally along the center
of the Salt Lake Valley. In the City of Midvale this main
line crosses at grade an east and west street known as
Center Street. Near the point of this crossing two branch
lines of Rio Grande's railroad are taken out from its main
line (Exhibit P-1).

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

3

One of these branches known as the "Little Cottonwood Branch" is taken out of the main line immediately
south of Center Street and runs in an easterly direction
abutting the south side of Center Street on premises owned
in fee by Rio Grande a distance of some 3,000 feet and then
extends southerly crossing State Street and serving industries on the east side of State Street. This branch line
extends approximately 1.75 miles and has approximately
.43 miles of side tracks. It had for the year 1957 an assessed
valuation of $6,525.00. This branch line presently serves
directly an oil company and a coal company, and through
a team track a rock wool company and a builders supply
company. The oil company and the coal company produced
approximately $21,500.00 in gross freight revenue in 1956.
The companies served by the team track produced some
ten cars of freight in the same period ( R. 28, 36, 82-83) .
Taking out of said main line immediately north of
Center Street, Rio Grande has another branch line known
as the "Bingham and Garfield Branch", which runs westerly down Center Street of Midvale and serves mines and
industries in the Bingham and Garfield area (R. 77).
Center Street is a road designated by statute as a part
of the State Road System and is under the jurisdiction of
the State Road Commission. The right of way owned in
fee by Rio Grande for its Little Cottonwood Branch is
approximately 27 feet in width and abuts along and runs
Parallel to the south side of Center Street for a distance
of approximately 3,000 feet. Abutting upon the south side
of such right of way are residential properties owned by
residents of the City of Midvale (Exhibit P-1). The tracks
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of Rio Grande on its Little Cottonwood Branch are elevated
above the street level of Center Street some 6 to 13 inches
(R. 46). The Road Commission, Midvale City and Rio
Grande have since 1954 been considering a plan for the
improvement of Center Street from the point where it
crosses Rio Grande's main line easterly to State Street,
whereby the tracks of Rio Grande on this branch would be
lowered, and the entire area paved over and used as part
of Center Street. After considerable negotiation the form
of agreement for carrying out such plan was approved by
the Road Commission and on January 10, 1957, transmitted
to Rio Grande for execution. Rio Grande executed the same
and transmitted it to the Road Commission on July 19,
1957. The Road Commission never signed the agreement
(Exhibits D-3 through D-11). Prior to transmitting the
form of agreement to Rio Grande for the lowering and paving over of its tracks on Center Street, the Road Commission in October or November, 1956, entered into a contract
for the improvement of Center Street under Project 1580.
The construction under this contract has now been completed. The project for lowering Rio Grande's tracks and
paving over has never been carried out although it could
be completed in about thirty days time (R. 27, 85).
After having arrived at a basis of agreement with
Rio Grande for the lowering of its tracks and the paving
over of the track area the Road Commission changed its
mind about completing the street project and asserted that
the Little Cottonwood Branch should be removed and destroyed in its entirety. This Rio Grande was unwilling
to do, and the Road Commission brought this action to
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condemn the entire branch. The reason assigned for such
change of position on the part of the Road Commission is
the Valley Freeway Project No. 1-01-7 (3) (R. 41-43).
Project 1-01-7 (3) involves the construction of a freeway which will be a part of the interstate road system under
the Highway Act of 1956. This freeway will enter Salt
Lake City at a point known generally as the Beck's Overpass near the Davis County line and will extend southerly
through Salt Lake County. The tentative proposal for location contemplates that this freeway will be easterly of
and near Rio Grande's main line at the point where the
freeway crosses Center Street (R. 30-31, Exhibit P-1).
Three problems require solution in connection with the
crossing of the freeway at this point. (a) The nature of
the grade separation between Center Street and the freeway must be determined. The present proposal is that
Center Street will underpass the freeway (R. 31). (b) The
connection of the Bingham and Garfield Branch into Rio
Grande's main line must be relocated. Rio Grande and the
Road Commission have not yet agreed upon such relocation
(R. 77-78, 87-88). (c) A determination must be made respecting the connection of the Little Cottonwood Branch
into Rio Grande's main line. The Commission proposes that
the entire branch be condemned and destroyed (R. 31).
Although 51% of the right of way in the vicinity of the
crossing in question has been secured the entire freeway
is still in the planning stage. Interchanges with other highways have not been fully determined and remain subjects
of controversy. No construction whatever is now going
forwarc1 in Salt Lake County on this freeway except for
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work on the Beck's Overpass, and no contracts have been
let for any such construction. It is estimated that three
to five years from date of hearing on the motion will pass
before any construction will take place (R. 37-40).
On this state of fact the trial court upon the hearing
on the Road Commission's motion made and entered the
following finding and order.
"This matter coming on regularly to be heard
before the Court on the 24th day of September, 1957,
on the motion of plaintiff for an order of immediate
occupancy of the premises sought to be condemned
in this action and the answer of the defendant to
such motion ; evidence oral and documentary having
been introduced by the parties and the matter having been argued by counsel and submitted to the
Court, and the Court being fully advised in the premises now finds that the evidence introduced at said
hearing is insufficient to justify the issuance of an
order permitting the plaintiff to immediately occupy
the premises sought to be condemned pending the
action,
"It is therefore ORDERED that said motion be
and the same is hereby denied."

Of this finding and order the Road Commission complains.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE COURT PROPERLY DENIED APPE~
LANT'S MOTION FOR IMMEDIATE OCCUPANCY.
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(a)

Appellant Could Obtain Immediate Occupancy Only Upon Compliance With the Statute.

(b)

The Granting of an Order of Immediate
Occupancy Rests in the Sound Discretion of
the Trial Court.

(c)

The Trial Court Properly Exercised Its Discretion in Denying Appellant's Motion for
Immediate Occupancy.

POINT II.
THE POWER OF APPELLANT TO CONDEMN
THE PROPERTY OF RESPONDENT IS NOT
AFFECTED BY THE ORDER APPEALED
FROM.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE COURT PROPERLY DENIED APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR IMMEDIATE OCCUPANCY.
(a)

Appellant Could Obtain Immediate Occupancy Only Upon Compliance With the Statute.

The legislature has conferred upon the Road Commission power to acquire real property or interests therein to
be used in the construction, maintenance or operation of
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State roads under the provisions of Section 27-2-9, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953, as amended by Chapter 43, Laws
of Utah, 1955.
The power of the Road Commission to obtain immediate occupancy of the premises pending the action is found
in Section 78-34-9, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which provides as follows:
"78-34-9. Occupancy of premises pending action.-The plaintiff may move the court or a judge
thereof, at any time after the commencement of suit,
on notice to the defendant, if he is a resident of the
state, or has appeared by attorney in the action,
otherwise by serving a notice directed to him on
the clerk of the court, for an order permitting the
plaintiff to occupy the premises sought to be condemned pending the action, and to do such work
thereon as may be required for the easement sought
according to its nature. The court or a judge thereof
shall take proof by affidavit or otherwise of the
value of the premises sought to be condemned and
of the damages which will accrue from the condemnation, and of the reasons for requiring a speedy
occupation, and shall grant or refuse the motion
according to the equity of the case and the relative
damages which may accrue to the parties. If the
motion is granted, the court or judge shall require
the plaintiff to execute and file in court a bond to
the defendant with sureties to be approved by the
court or judge, in a penal sum to be fixed by the
court or judge not less than double the value of the
premises sought to be condemned and the damages
which will ensue from condemnation, as the same
may appear to the court or judge on the hearing,
and conditioned to pay the adjudged value of the
premises and all damages in case the property is
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condemned, and to pay all damages ar1smg from
occupation before judgment in case the premises are
not condemned, and all costs adjudged to the defendant in the action. The sureties shall justify before
the court or judge after a reasonable notice to the
defendant of the time and place of justification. The
amounts fixed shall be for the purposes of the motion only, and shall not be admissible in evidence on
final hearing. The court or judge may also, pending
the action, restrain the defendant from hindering or
interfering with the occupation of the premises and
the doing thereon of the work required for the easement."
Thus it appears clear that if the Road Commission is
entitled to immediate occupancy of the Little Cottonwood
Branch of Rio Grande, a showing must be made which will
bring it within the authorization of the foregoing statute.
(b)

The Granting of an Order of Immediate
Occupancy Rests in the Sound Discretion of
the Trial Court.

The rule is well established that the issuance of an
order of immediate occupancy under a statute such as ours
rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. This rule
was announced in Utah Copper Co. v. Montana-Bingham
Consolidated Mining Co., et al., 69 Utah 423, 255 Pac. 672,
where this court, speaking through Justice Straup at page
437 of the Utah Reports stated:
"Under the statute it is apparent that the power
of the court to grant or refuse an application to
occupy premises sought to be condemned, 'pending
the action,' is, to a large extent, discretionary, de-
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pending upon the showing of necessity for a speedy
occupation. * * *"
The same rule was announced by the Supreme Court
of Colorado in People v. District Court, 17 Pac. 298, at page
299, as follows :

"* * * The rule granting possession pending the proceedings was discretionary, and might
have been denied by the judge. In many cases instituted under this statute it is the duty of the judge
to decline to enter such rule. * * *"
In the exercise of its discretion the trial court under
our statute should consider the following factors:
{1)
demned.

The value of the premises sought to be con-

(2)
parties.

The relative damages that will accrue to the

{3)

The reasons requiring a speedy occupation.

The foregoing factors mark the boundaries within
which the discretion of the trial court may be exercised.
A consideration of these factors conclusively shows that
the trial court properly exercised its discretion in denying
the motion of the Road Commission.
{c)

The Trial Court Properly Exercised Its Discretion in Denying Appellant's Motion for
Immediate Occupancy.

The essential factors here in determining whether the
Road Commission was entitled to immediate occupancy of
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the Little Cottonwood Branch of Rio Grande are the relative damage accruing to the parties and the need for immediate occupancy. We will therefore give consideration
to each of these factors.
In considering the damage which would be sustained
by Rio Grande it was well recognized by court and counsel
that if the court had entered the order requested, by the
Road Commission, Rio Grande's Little Cottonwood Branch
would have been forthwith destroyed (R. 24). The immediate
effect would have been to terminate all of Rio Grande's operations upon this branch with the loss of all revenue flowing therefrom. More serious however would have been
the effect on the industries served by Rio Grande on this
branch. These industries are not parties to this action.
They have not been served with any notice of these proceedings, yet had the court entered the order sought these
parties would suddenly have found themselves without rail
service. Railroads are highways, Oregon Short Line Railroad Company v. Murray City, 2 Utah 2d 427, 277 P. 2d 798,
and upon the destruction of Rio Grande's branch of railroad this highway would instantly be closed to all such
industries. At this stage of the case we have no means of
knowing what the damage would be to such industries, but
it may very well be substantial.
We are unable to perceive any damage which has or
would result to the Road Commission in being unable immediately to seize this branch of railroad. It may very well
be that the Road Commission will need to enter upon the
railroad property for the purpose of making surveys, locations, maps, etc. They need not destroy the railroad in
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order to do so for such right is expressly granted to them
under Section 78-34-5, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which
provides as follows :
"78-34-5. Right of entry for survey and Iocation.-In all cases where land is required for public
use, the person, or his agent, in charge of such use
may survey and locate the same; but it must be
located in the manner which will be most compatible
with the greatest public good and the least private
injury, and subject to the provisions of this chapter.
The person, or his agent, in charge of such public
use may enter upon the land and make examinations,
surveys and maps thereof, and such entry shall
constitute no cause of action in favor of the owners
of the lands, except for injuries resulting from negligence, wantonness or malice."
No serious contention can be made with respect to
highway construction on Center Street. The work which
was covered by the contract entered into in 1956 has now
been completed. The further work on that street pursuant
to the arrangement completed with Rio Grande and then
abandoned by the Road Commission has been deferred
pending the further development of the freeway project.
No evidence was offered by the Road Commission indicating any damage whatever resulting from being denied
the right immediately to seize this line of railroad and we
are firmly convinced that there is no damage whatever.
Turning to the need for immediate occupancy we have
here a situation in which a highway is now in the planning
stage. Before the plan is completed at least two problems
wholly separate from the condemnation of Rio Grande's
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Little Cottonwood Branch, must be solved, the one relates
to the crossing of Center Street by the freeway and the
other has to do with the relocation of Rio Grande's Bingham
and Garfield Branch. We have no doubt that all of the
problems incident to the construction of the Valley freeway will eventually be solved. We have no doubt that this
freeway will be constructed. We are at a loss, however,
to perceive how a project which will be in construction
some three to five years in the future necessitates that the
Road Commission shall today on summary procedure seize
this branch of railroad.
In its brief the Road Commission states :

"* * * It will take from one to two years
to fully plan the structures and the design of the
highway so it is necessary to obtain immediate occupancy of the property involved in this action to
accomplish the speedy construction of the highway."
Appellant does not explain why it is necessary to seize
the railroad in order to plan the structures. The design or
plan of structures is made in the drafting office of the
project engineers, miles removed from the physical location. If any surveys are to be made upon the ground the
Road Commission already has all necessary authority under
said Section 78-34-5, supra. How then can it seriously be
contended that a present seizure is necessary to engage in
planning for future construction.
It seems clear to us that the legislature intended by
the provisions of said Section 78-34-9 that a project must
be advanced beyond the stage of planning to justify an
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immediate occupation of premises. Construction must bE
authorized and either in progress or in preparation of im.
mediate commencement. Counsel cite Home Gas Compan~
v. Kuruc, 132 N. Y. S. 2d 316. The basis for the order o1
occupancy in that case is stated by the court at page 321
as follows:
"The plaintiff has applied to this Court by a
separate motion, returnable June 21, 1954 for immediate temporary possession of the easement involved in these proceedings. The Court reserved
decision until after the trial. It appearing to the
Court from plaintiff's moving papers and from the
evidence on the trial, that the plaintiff is now ready
to commence construction, and it further appearing
that the need is immediate and urgent to increase the
supply of natural gas in this area at the earliest possible date, and it appearing to the satisfaction of this
Court that the public interest would be prejudiced
by the delay, it is the determination of this Court,
that the plaintiff should be granted immediate temporary possession of the easement which it seeks to
condemn in these proceedings."
In Town Superintendent of Highways of Frankfurt,
87 N. Y. S. 2d 453, likewise cited by counsel, the facts are
not shown. The court at page 455 merely stated that:
"From the facts before this Court, it does appear that the public interest will be prejudiced by
delay in the above matter, and the section does
offer relief that would prevent the public interests
from being prejudiced by such delay."
Appellant appears to rely upon State Road Commission

v. Franklin, 95 A. 2d 99. That case was decided, however,
under constitutional and statutory provisions which ex-
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pressly authorized the Road Commission to take possession
of the property being condemned prior to construction. We
find no provisions of our constitution or statute authorizing
such procedure. The legislature may, subject to state and
federal constitutional limitations, enlarge the powers of
the Road Commission but until further legislative action
is taken the Road Commission is restricted by the statutory
provisions cited above. It should be observed further in
this connection that under many of the statutes the body
exercising the power of eminent domain is required upon
taking immediate possession to deposit into court the estimated value of the property being condemned. In this
jurisdiction, however, since the decision in Barnes v. Wade,
90 Utah 1, 58 P. 2d 297, the Road Commission may take
immediate possession without the furnishing of bond or
the depositing of any award. We would think that if the
legislature saw fit to extend the powers of the Road Commission to permit immediate occupancy for the purpose of
planning highways which may be constructed three to five
years in the future, it would require a deposit of an award
to protect the property owner against damages resulting
from a dismissal of the action because of a change in plan.
Regardless of what the legislature may see fit to do
for the future we submit that under the facts presented on
appellant's motion and under the present statute the trial
court properly denied the motion for immediate occupancy.
POINT II.
THE POWER OF APPELLANT TO CONDEMN
THE PROPERTY OF RESPONDENT IS NOT
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AFFECTED BY THE ORDER APPEALED
FROM.
Appellant in its second point urges that the Road Commission has a more necessary public use of the premises
sought to be condemned than has Rio Grande. We are uncertain of the precise contention which appellant makes
under this point. Does appellant contend that a more necessary public use ipso facto entitles the Road Commission to
immediate occupancy. If such is the point of the contention we think it is without merit. The right of the Road
Commission to obtain immediate occupancy depends, as
we have shown, upon its ability to make a proper showing
under the statute. Unless such a showing can be made, as
the statutes now stand, the Road Commission cannot immediately occupy the premises. The trial court properly
found that the evidence was insufficient to support the
motion and properly denied the same.
If the appellant contends that the issue of more necessary public use was involved in or decided by the trial
court in passing upon the motion for immediate occupancy,
then appellant misconceives the nature of the motion for
immediate occupancy and the effect of the denial of such
motion.
In Utah Copper Co. v. lJfontana-Bingham Consolidated
lJf.ining Co., supra,, this court laid at rest the question of
the nature of orders permitting immediate occupancy in
condemnation cases. In that case, on motion for immediate
occupancy the trial court entered an order to the effect
that plaintiff had a right to condemn and to take possession
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pending final determination. Upon further hearing plaintiff offered to introduce further evidence on the right to
condemn. The offer was objected to and the objection sustained. Complaint was made of the ruling. In commenting
on the ruling this court, at page 435 of the Utah Report,
said:

"* * * It is urged by the respondent and
denied by the appellant that the order granting immediate possession and occupancy was res adjudicata as to the right of the plaintiff to condemn and
occupy the premises, and that the only remaining
question to be determined was the amount of damages. On the contrary, the appellant contends that
the order was merely interlocutory and during the
pendency of the proceedings was subject to modification or to be vacated as circumstances and conditions might require, and, being interlocutory, the
defendant was entitled to be further heard on the
question of the plaintiff's right to condemn and
take or possess the premises. We think the contention of the appellant in such respect is well founded.

*

*

*

*

"Under the statute it is apparent that the power
of the court to grant or refuse an application to
occupy premises sought to be condemned, 'pending
the action,' is, to a large extent, discretionary, depending upon the showing of necessity for a speedy
occupation. To wisely exercise the discretion the
court might well require the plaintiff to make a
showing, not only as to the necessity for a sp~edy
occupation, but also a prima facie showing as to his
- right to condemn, if that right be controverted. It
also would seem, from the language of the statute,
that the plaintiff may move the court, etc., to occupy
the premises sought to be condemned, 'pending the
action,' and requiring the giving of a bond 'to pay
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all damages arising from occupation before judgment in case the premises are not condemned,' that
an order permitting immediate possession 'pending
the action' would be interlocutory and not final, and
on the face of the order itself it appears that it permitted the possession and occupancy 'pending the
action and until the further order of the court,' and
thus was intended to be merely interlocutory. When
the cause was finally submitted as to all of the
issues, the court made findings and conclusions and
rendered a decree upon all of the issues, including
the questions or issues that the use of the premises
applied for was a public use and authorized under
the statute, that the taking was necessary for such
use, and that the plaintiff was entitled to exercise
the right of eminent domain. Thus, because of the
statute and the nature of the orders the first granting possession pending the action and until the furthe order of the court and the second a perpetual
occupancy, we think the first order was interlocutory and the second final. Templeton v. District
Court, 47 Cal. 70; People v. District Court, 11 Colo.
147, 17 P. 298."
The trial court in the case at bar carefully avoided
passing upon any question relative to the ultimate rights
of the parties. It confined itself strictly to the matter
which it was called upon to decide under the motion, namely,
whether at that stage of the proceedings the Road Commission was entitled to occupy Rio Grande's branch of railroad. Under the rule announced in the Utah Copper Company case, supra, the order of the court denying the motion
is merely interlocutory. It in no way impairs or affects
the ultimate rights of the parties which must be determined
upon the trial of the case.
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Due process of law and orderly judicial procedure
require that the proceedings go forward for trial at which
both parties may have an opportunity to offer evidence and
be fully heard on every issue which may require a determination on the merits. If on the evidence presented at such
trial there is an issue on the question of a more necessary
public use or the power of appellant to condemn the property in question the trial court can and will on the evidence
then before it determine any such issues. No such issues
were considered by the trial court on the motion and none
are before this court on this appeal. Until any such issues
are properly presented, heard and decided any rights which
appellant may have are in no manner impaired or affected
by the interlocutory order now appealed from. It therefore becomes unnecessary to consider the cases cited by
appellant on its second point.
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CONCLUSION
We are concerned here only with the question of
whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying appellant's motion for immediate occupation of respondent's
Little Cottonwood Branch of railroad. There was no actual
showing at the hearing on such motion of a need for a
present occupation of such railroad. The substance of
appellant's contention is that the issuance of the order for
immediate occupancy is necessary to plan a highway to be
constructed in the future. Our statute permits the issuance
of such an order only in cases where a need for an actual
speedy occupation is shown. The motion was therefore
properly denied. The order is interlocutory only. It is no
manner affects or impairs the ultimate rights of the parties. These are preserved pending a determination by the
trial court upon the merits.
The order of the trial court should therefore be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
S. N. CORNWALL,
VAN COTT, BAGLEY,
CORNWALL & McCARTHY,
Attorneys for Defendant
and Respondent.
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